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DEDUCTION OF PROMOTIONAL CAMPAIGN COSTS AS
"ORDINARY AND NECESSARY" EXPENSES
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973)
Taxpayer conducted an advertising and promotional campaign to
regain lost customers for its line of Loft candies.1 The campaign
attempted to secure franchise agreements with drugstore owners, pur-
suant to which the owners would retail Loft candy, while Briarcliff
would assist the store owner in installing a refrigerating display unit
and provide the candy at a discount price.2 Briarcliff deducted the
costs of the campaign as ordinary and necessary business expenses
for the taxable year pursuant to section 162(a) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954.4  The Commissioner disallowed two-thirds of the
campaign costs5 on the ground that the franchise agreements were
capital assets, and hence the campaign costs were nondeductible capital
expenditures. 6  The Tax Court upheld the disallowance. 7  On appeal,
1. Briarcliff Candy Corp., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. %I 72,043 (1972). Due to a shift
in population from urban centers to the suburbs, the taxpayer's urban stores were rapidly
losing business. In addition, retail stores that the taxpayer established in the suburbs
failed to attract a profitable volume business. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,
475 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 72,043, at 180 (1972). More specifically, the drugstore
owner agreed to install a refrigerating unit and display area for Loft candy and prom-
ised to use his best efforts to sell the candy. As consideration, the taxpayer agreed not
to enfranchise another store in the area, to aid the retailer in installing and operating
the display, and to furnish the product at a discount price. The contracts varied from
one to five years in duration and were renewable. Id.
3. These expenses were recurring since they were incurred in every taxable year
from 1962 to 1970. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 780 (2d
Cir. 1973).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a):
Trade or Business Expenses: (a) In General-There shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ....
Every revenue act has contained a provision allowing the ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense deduction.
5. The Commissioner permitted § 162(a) deductions totalling $332,869, which
were attributable to the cost of supplies, commissions, and bad debts. Briarcliff Candy
Corp., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1I 72,043, at 181 (1972).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263 provides:
Capital Expenditures:
(a) General Rule-No deduction shall be allowed for-
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the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held: All of the
advertising and promotional costs were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses pursuant to section 162(a) of the Code.'
Section 162(a) allows the deduction of ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses incurred during the taxable year.9 While an ordinary
and necessary expenditure need not be an habitual or normal ex-
pense to the particular taxpayer, it must be considered normal accord-
ing to the type of business in which the taxpayer is involved." In
addition, the expenditure must be so closely related to the economic
needs of the taxpayer as to be considered an integral part of his busi-
ness. 1' Even if an expenditure is "normar' and directly related to
the taxpayer's business, however, the deduction will be disallowed if
the benefits resulting from the expenditure are determined to be cap-
ital assets.12 Expenditures for capital assets are nondeductible un-
der section 263(a). 13  Relying on the "greater than one year" rule, 4
the Commissioner often argues that the benefits derived from a tax-
payer's expenditures have a "life" of greater than one year's duration
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.
(2) Any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the ex-
haustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made.
7. Briarcliff Candy Corp., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 72,043 (1972).
8. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). The statute sets forth five elements
necessary to establish deductibility. The expenditure must be: (1) an expense; (2)
paid or incurred in the taxable year; (3) for carrying on any trade or business; (4)
ordinary; and (5) necessary. Id. See generally 4A J. MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL IN-
COME TAATION § 25.01 (J. Malone ed. 1972).
10. Courts recognize that although an expense may occur only once to any indi-
vidual taxpayer, it nevertheless must be classified as ordinary and necessary if the ex-
pense is so common that failure to incur it would be considered unusual. See Deputy
v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Bing v.
Helvering, 76 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
11. The concept of integrality is necessary to prevent deduction of expenses which
only indirectly aid the business, but which may directly further a personal interest of
a manager or director. See Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46
(1955); Allen v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v.
Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 67-1, 1967-1 CoM. BtLL. 28.
12. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263.
13. Id.
14. The "greater than one year" rule is the basic rule used by the Commissioner
to determine if a capital asset has been created. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.173-1(c), 1.461-
l(a)(1) (1973).
327
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/7
328 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:326
and therefore the payments for such benefits are nondeductible capi-
tal expenditures.""
The "greater than one year" rule does not apply, however, if the
resulting benefit is a repair of an existing asset10 or if the purpose of
the expenditure was to protect an existing investment or business.1
Thus, even where the benefit resulting from an expenditure lasts for
more than one year, a court must examine the nature of the benefit
and the purpose for which the benefit was acquired in order to deter-
mine if the "greater than one year" rule is inapplicable, in which
case the expenditure may be properly deductible if found to be an
ordinary and necessary expense.
Advertising and promotional expenditures intended to -increase cur-
rent sales or use of services do not create future benefits and hence
ordinarily are deductible,' 8 since they are recognized as a normal
and essential element of modem business.' 9 Advertising and promo-
tional expenditures intended to promote future sales or use of ser-
15. The theory underlying the Commissioner's argument is that a benefit which
lasts more than one year adds to the value of the business and hence should be consid-
ered a capital asset. A benefit which has a life of less than one year, on the other
hand, normally will have to be continually repurchased in order to maintain the value
of the business. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345,
361 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Manhattan Co., 50 T.C. 78, 86 (1968); Liberty
Ins. Bank, 14 B.T.A. 1428, 1435 (1929), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Commissioner
v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932).
16. See New Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1952)
(storage track for railroad cars necessary for maintenance of normal coal output since
car shortage was impending); Perkins Bros. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 152 (8th Cir.
1935) (advertising expenditures necessary to get newspaper circulation up to normal
level were deductible); J.H. Collingwood, 20 T.C. 937 (1953) (cost of terracing acre-
age to prevent loss of topsoil deductible as expense in nature of repair).
17. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) (legal fees incurred in
defense of "fraud order" by Postmaster in connection with mail order business held de-
ductible as expenditure to protect going business); United States v. E.L. Bruce Co., 180
F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1950); Helvering v. Community Bond & Mortgage Corp., 74 F.2d
727 (2d Cir. 1935); Scruggs-Vandervoort-Barney, Inc., 7 T.C. 779 (1946).
Note that the deduction allowed for the repair of an existing asset, see note 16 supra,
results from an examination of the benefit itself, whereas the "purpose" exception leads
to a deduction whether or not the expenditure results in effective benefit.
18. See Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950); cf. French Broad Ice Cream Co.,
57-2 U.S. TAx. CAs. f 9972 (E.D. Tenn. 1957); Rev. Rul. 69-510, 1969-2 CuM. BuLL. 23.
See also Peterson, Treatment of Unusual Deductions of a Business, N.Y.U. 7TH. INsT.
ON FED. TAX. 1, 2 (1949).
Such expenditures are subject only to a test of reasonableness. INT. REV. CoDE OF
1954, § 162(c). See generally 4A J. MaRTENs, supra note 9, § 25.38, at 191.
19. Cf. notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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vices, however, may create benefits with a life of greater than one
year."0 The nature and purpose of such benefits therefore must be
examined in order to determine whether the "greater than one year"
rule applies. Although the ultimate benefit of advertising expendi-
tures is "customers,"' 21 the court will treat the customer-acquiring
device as the benefit to be examined for purposes of determining
the deductibility of the expenditure. 22
In Briarcliff the Second Circuit held that the taxpayer's expenditures
for the franchise agreements were deductible pursuant to section 162
(a), despite the Commissioner's argument that the agreements had a
life of greater than one year and hence were capital assets. The
court's decision did not rest, however, on the taxpayer's having estab-
lished an exception to the "greater than one year" rule.2 4 Rather, the
20. See Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1958); Houston
Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
722 (1937); French Broad Ice Cream Co., 57-2 U.S. TAx CAs. 1 9972 (E.D. Tenn.
1957), 4A J. METENs, supra note 9, § 25.38, at 193.
21. The courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether the customers them-
selves constitute capital assets. Compare Perkins Bros. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 152
(8th Cir. 1935), with Meridith Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.
1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 646 (1937).
This issue as it relates to publications was settled by statute. INT. REV. CoDn oF
1954, § 173 provides that all expenditures by newspapers and magazines to maintain
or increase circulation can either be deducted in the taxable year or amortized. The
taxpayer has the option to choose the tax treatment he desires.
22. The court will decide whether a capital asset has been purchased in the tax-
payer's attempt to gain customers. In Briarcliff, for example, the customer-acquiring
devices were the franchise agreements. See generally Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66
(1950) (showdogs); Liberty Ins. Bank v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Commissioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320
(6th Cir. 1932) (novelty banks); Northwestern Yeast Co., 5 B.T.A. 232 (1926) (sam-
ple products).
In the publication cases, courts examined the customers themselves to determine this
issue. See note 21 supra.
23. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). The Commissioner relied heavily on Houston
Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937),
which involved an advertising and promotional campaign to establish the taxpayer in
a new geographical area. The campaign resulted in the acquisition of a large number
of new customers and the elimination of all competition in that area. The expenditures
were held to be nondeductible under § 162(a). Thus, the Commissioner asserted in
Briarcliff that Houston established the principle that any intensive campaign to get new
customers creates capital expenditures and reaffirmed the "greater than one year" rule.
The court in Briarcliff distinguished Houston by noting that the expenditures in Briar-
cliff were intended only to regain lost customers from the taxpayer's established custo-
mer base, and not, as in Houston, to acquire new customers in a new geographical area.
24. 475 F.2d at 782-83. Although the court recognized that its decision was con-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/7
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court determined that the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner
v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association25 had shifted emphasis away
from that rule to a test permitting a section 162(a) deduction unless
the resulting benefit constitutes a "separate and distinct additional as-
set."2 Following this approach, the Second Circuit reasoned that since
store owners were only retail agents for the taxpayer's established prod-
ucts27 and since the agreements gave the taxpayer no property interest
in the refrigerating display,28 Briarcliff had not obtained an "additional
asset," and hence the campaign costs were deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.29
Although this approach apparently eliminates examination of the
taxpayer's purpose in making the expenditure,30 since by its terms it
looks only to the nature of the resulting benefit, it would appear
that deductions allowed under the purpose exception to the "greater
than one year" rule3 would remain deductible under the "additional
asset" test.32
sistent with a long line of cases allowing deduction of expenditures for the protection
of an existing business, see note 17 supra and accompanying text, it did not analyze
the case or base its decision in terms of the purpose exception to the "greater than
one year" rule.
25. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
26. Id. Lincoln involved the deductibility pursuant to § 162(a) of an additional
payment to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation which the taxpayer was
required to pay by statute. The Court mentioned the "greater than one year" rule, stated
that it was not controlling, and then articulated the new test. 403 U.S. at 354. The
Court found the payment in Lincoln to be a nondeductible additional asset since the tax-
payer had a continuing interest in the money because of the possibility that a portion
of the payment might be refunded in the future. Id. at 355.
27. The court implied that the "greater than one year" rule would still be relevant
in a case in which the taxpayer had established a new product. 475 F.2d at 782-87.
28. Id. From this the court implied that the agreements were of no cash value
to Briarcliff, and therefore could not be considered capital assets. But see United
States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972).
29. 475 F.2d at 786.
30. The issue under the new test is whether an additional asset has been created.
Under the exceptions to the former rule the taxpayer could establish his deduction by
showing that his purpose was to protect an existing business. The new test appears
to eliminate this factor from consideration.
31. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
32. The "additional asset" test did not revoke the "greater than one year" rule, but
simply added another test.
The result in Briarcliff probably would have been the same under the former test.
The franchise agreements were intended to rebuild the taxpayer's business. Since Bri-
arcliff (Loft) had an established but depleted customer base, the expenditures for the
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Far more significant is the fact that a taxpayer now may be able,
pursuant to the "additional asset" test, currently to deduct expendi-
tures that were previously nondeductible. Formerly, the taxpayer
could acquire the section 162(a) deduction only by proving either
that the resulting benefits lasted less than one year or that the expend-
iture was excepted from the "greater than one year" rule. 3 Now,
however, it appears that the taxpayer can obtain the current deduction
simply by proving that the benefit, regardless of its "life," does not
constitute an "additional asset. 34
agreements were expenditures made to protect an existing business. See notes 17 &
26 supra.
33. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
34. See note 33 supra. The courts in both Lincoln and Briarclif treated the ques-
tion whether an "additional asset" had been created as a question of law. Therefore,
after a taxpayer has proven what benefit was created, he must argue that it does not
qualify as an "additional asset." See notes 29 & 30 supra.
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